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I. Arendt’s human rights critique as a critique of abstraction
Hannah Arendt saw the abstractness of human rights as consequential for their justifica-
tion as well as their validity. Hers is a dramatic description of their ineffectiveness as pro-
tection rights for refugees, who far from being protected were in fact outlawed. She con-
trasts this with the much quoted only human right, the right to have rights (das “Recht, 
Rechte zu haben”, Arendt 2001a: 615)1, the right to participate in a legal community, liter-
ally “auf Mitgliedschaft in einer politischen Gemeinschaft” (Arendt 1949: 766), the right 
to membership of a political community. The following explores the potential application 
of this actual and ‘more concrete’ human right, whose task it is to strengthen and enlarge 
the meaning and validity of human rights (with detailed evidence: Rosenmüller 2013). 
* Stefanie Rosenmüller is Professor of Philosophy, Ethics and Education at the University of Applied Sciences 
Dortmund.
1 All Arendt sources mentioned in this text refer to German editions of her work.
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a) The so-called dual nature of human rights
When it comes to the abstraction of human rights two aspects stand out and stem initially
from the dual nature (cf. Alexy 2011) of human rights as both moral claim and positive 
right. Human rights are spoken of at different levels of validity. On the one hand, it is 
purely a matter of moral claims derived from the universal validity of human rights, while
it refers, on the other hand, to these rights as international law, as European law, and in 
national constitutions such as the German constitution (Basic Law) in the form of funda-
mental rights. The dual nature of human rights refers to their existence as mere moral 
claims (first nature) and as rights (second nature) endowed in part with legal power and 
enforceability. This legal power is graded progressively, since national basic rights as con-
stitutional law rather than international law are easier to enforce and more actionable. In 
other words, as positive law, human rights become more abstract, since their application 
demands enforceability. This notwithstanding, human rights are less ‘abstract’ than other 
ethical ideals and claims insofar as they are in possession of a certain amount of legal 
power. So much for the first aspect of abstraction, which is certainly an issue in Arendt's 
work.
Secondly, the content of human rights is abstracted from valid national law and its cul-
tural and particularist context, and verbalizes universal claims. This, too, can be pilloried 
as abstraction from the concrete context. Thirdly, human rights can be interpreted as ab-
stract principles that radiate onto the law but are themselves more than is manifest in the 
defensive function of the law (cf. Alexy 1992). 
b) ‚Aporia’ in Arendt
Arendt’s work contains other aspects of the abstraction critique, all of which will be out-
lined here. Her chapter on “Die Aporien der Menschenrechte” (“The Perplexities of Hu-
man Rights”) appears to suggest that even erroneous conceptions have a political impact. 
She states, for example, that human rights are aporetic but goes on to formulate a single 
human right, the now well-known right to have rights (das “Recht, Rechte zu haben”, 
Arendt 2001a: 615). In my view this is not entirely a matter of aporia but rather of a con-
fusion of categories and attitudes that could in fact be resolved. Referring to aporia in the 
sense of being confused places Arendt in her late work Das Denken (Thinking) in the Ar-
istotelian and Platonic tradition of amazement at the very beginning of thinking and 
philosophy (Arendt 1989a: 142 f.). For Arendt, thinking begins when it shatters conven-
tional rules. She is clearly concerned with a new way of thinking human rights through 
and of understanding them. Arendt wants to point out certain inconsistencies in the clas-
sic conceptions of human rights, for which the genuine human right – the right to have 
rights – offers a path of solution. She deducts this ex negativo, opening with a methodical
instruction in which she makes clear that to discern this right it might be useful to first 
take a look at the legal situation of the lawless in order to ascertain the rights they have 
actually lost and precisely why loss of these rights has placed them in an utterly lawless 
situation; “um dieses Recht zu entdecken, mag es nützlich sein, sich erst einmal die legale 
Lage der Rechtlosen selbst anzusehen, um ausfindig zu machen, welche Rechte sie denn 
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eigentlich verloren und warum gerade der Verlust solcher Rechte sie in eine Situation 
absoluter Rechtlosigkeit gebracht hatte” (Arendt 2001a: 607).  
This procedure gives an impression of positive law, according to which the effectiveness
of a right is measured by its actual impact or more precisely its political manifestation 
rather than by its formal setting, a phenomenology clearly at odds with the validity 
criteria of today’s legal theory of proper lawfulness, social effectiveness and substantive 
correctness (e.g., Alexy 1992: 29). For even the withdrawal of rights in Arendt’s opinion 
has a real, i.e., a positive impact. Here Arendt contradicts the liberal theory of separation 
expressed in the notion of a dual nature of human rights: The separation theory distin-
guishes between de jure validity as a purely moral justification and de facto validity, that 
is, the enforceability and executability of the law (cf. Krawietz/Aarnio 1993: 53). The mor-
al claim of human rights would then be made on the international stage in order to cor-
roborate and enforce them more and more. Arendt, on the other hand, sees the moral 
claim of human rights and legal enforcement as political phenomena, as manifestations of
the law, both of which require consent. Absence of this consent implies in both cases im-
potent violence that oppresses people with the tyranny of reason or the power of guns. In 
her work, Arendt ultimately calls for plurality, not merely in democratic action but like-
wise in thought. This is not unimportant for her political conception of the law.
c) The failure of human rights in the event of disenfranchisement by law 
Arendt bases her idea of aporia in human rights on the stateless, who are beyond the legal
protection pale of the state and consequently dependent on human rights. They are the 
real addressees of human rights. As she shows in her book on totalitarianism, human 
rights fail at the precise moment they are called upon to function, i.e., irrespective of the 
positive right to protection. Conceptual exclusion from the legal addressee group was fol-
lowed by de facto exclusion from the political space and ultimately from the world of the 
living. Here Arendt describes disenfranchisement not simply as lack of protection, she 
outlines the idea of a positive anticipation of genocide by virtue of this disenfranchise-
ment. Waltraud Meints aptly spoke of Arendt as a thinker of the social because she traced 
the production of superfluous humanity (cf. Meints-Stender 2004). Meints has also 
shown that Arendt’s analysis of total domination in Elemente und Ursprünge totaler 
Herrschaft (The Origins of Totalitarianism) serves as “Spiegelschrift”, as mirror writing 
for political theory (Meints 2011: 25). This systemizing theory also ties in with Arendt’s 
concept of the law. 
Arendt divides the loss of rights into a sequence of two, or three steps as Bernd Heiter 
once tellingly stated: (1) loss of a home through flight, which she equates with “Verlust 
des Raums und des Standes”, loss of space and of status, and loss of a place in the world 
(Arendt 2001a: 607), (2) loss of legal protection by the government, which goes hand in 
hand with the withdrawal of citizenship and statelessness, and (3) “absoluten 
Rechtlosigkeit”, total lawlessness (Arendt 2001a: 611) or “absoluten Unschuld”, total in-
nocence (Arendt 2001a: 610), which can be seen as a separate step or aggravation of the 
first step, since Arendt points here to the plight of the stateless as not even that of a crim-
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inal, the target of criminal law, but as no longer addressees of the law in any form 
whatsoever.
Two functions of the law are described here: legal status grants a place among people, it
gives protection and renders the person an addressee of the law. It is my belief that this 
order suggests a ranking in Arendt’s work, which sees legal protection as secondary, since 
it presupposes legal status and involvement in the game and the rules of the game. This 
implies that Arendt not only credits the law with negative power and a protective function
but would also suggest that it contains positive and unstoppable creative power (cf. Allen 
2002: 132).
d)  Abstraction as exclusion 
Arendt thus demonstrates that a gradual descent into lawlessness signifies the loss of a 
place in the world, “des Standpunktes in der Welt” (Arendt 2001a: 613). When she defines
the loss of a place in the world negatively as the status of not belonging to a community of 
any kind, “zu keiner irgendwie gearteten Gemeinschaft zu gehören” (Arendt 2001a: 612), 
she refers exclusively to a relationship with the fellow world, “Mitwelt” (Arendt 1981: 169)
rather than the thing world, “Dingwelt” (Arendt 1981: 87). Arendt draws the conclusion, 
however, that the only genuine human right is the right to this place in the world, the 
right to have rights. This line of argument should also be understood as phenomenologic-
al evidence, if we are to take the concept of reality and appearance in Arendt’s work seri-
ously (cf. Schmitz 2001). For in the loss of rights is the implicit recognition that the hu-
man right in each de facto withdrawal of rights appears as a missing right. Unlike the 
classic liberal political theories, Arendt does not construct a fictitious sequence of steps 
from nature to civilization that guarantees and protects rights – that would simply be one 
concept of law, which she mostly refers to as nomos in Was ist Politik? (The Promise of 
Politics) and contrasts with the Roman lex (cf. Arendt 2003). Quite the contrary, in fact, 
lawlessness first arises with dehumanization or naturalization, and is immediately appar-
ent as such. Arendt does not therefore assume that humans were originally natural beings
– they are instead first and foremost political beings. This order is one of method rather 
than of ontology, albeit notoriously controversial due to its normative charge. In its de-
fence it could be argued that the theory of an originally natural being is as normatively 
charged and difficult to justify as its opposite. 
e) The abstract human being: three aspects of being human 
Why then should the only human right escape the aporia Arendt perceives in human 
rights? Here Arendt uses several arguments in the direction of what can be summarized 
under the heading of abstraction (cf. Arendt 2001a: 623). The failure of human rights lies 
primarily in their abstractness, a critique of both their theoretical justification and their 
enforceability, i.e., their application. Arendt first attacks the justification for human rights
in as much as it uses the reduced human image of an abstract being, “abstrakten 
Menschenwesen” (Arendt 2001a: 623), that is pre-political and thus ineffective.
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A political justification for human rights, on the other hand, derives from a crucial dis-
tinction between three aspects of man (cf. Arendt 1998: 40f.) that tie in with the two basic
conditions for plurality and natality (cf. Arendt 1981: 14ff.). Accordingly, human rights 
cannot be justified by human nature or reason, since both explanations consider the hu-
man being as such and only in the singular.
In Arendt’s view, however, man as the human species (first aspect) is an abstract hu-
man being (cf. Arendt 2001a: 632) that, seen as a biological genus, finds itself in a state of 
abandonment, “Verlassenheit”, because the natality principle has been ignored.  Natality 
in Arendt’s diction means that a human being is not obliged to tie in with the genus, 
“nicht anknüpfen muss an die Gattung” (Arendt 1981: 353, note 3) but can act spontan-
eously as a beginning being and start afresh. The natural law justification sees human be-
ings merely as a genus placed in a pre-legal conceptual context. Arendt takes a similar 
view of the criticism of man as history’s historical being, since progress in her work falls 
into the same category as reduction to a biological genus and is thus likewise at odds with 
human dignity (cf. Arendt 1998: 102). Even justifying human rights with human dignity 
of the individual is subject to the logic of reduction, which understands man as a singular 
being. Derived from a pre-legal conceptual context, such justifications are ineligible, since
they have a tendency to conceptually promote lawlessness and barbarity, and ultimately 
render the law powerless. So much for the natality principle. 
Similarly, contemplating man as an intelligible reasonable being (second aspect) refers 
for justification to the wrong category: Man as a reasonable being is lonely, “einsam”, ac-
cording to Arendt because despite his perception as a mentally spontaneous being he be-
longs to the spiritual realm, “Geisterreich”, of intelligible beings and is thus abstracted 
from his plurality (Arendt 1998: 41). Loneliness in reflection is by no means a negative at-
tribute (cf. Arendt 2006: 80ff.) since it describes the prerequisite for conscience as an in-
ner dialogue. What it describes, however, is a mere self-reference. As a reasonable being 
in the Kantian sense, human beings are not plural but equal, that is, they are guided by 
universal reason. Hence the principle of plurality is either given too little consideration or 
human beings are abstracted from it.
Only Arendt’s view of man (third aspect) as earthbound creatures, “Erdenwesen” 
(Arendt 1998: 41), seems to take into account the two vital principles of plural beings and 
beings that can start anew, i.e., the principle of plurality and the principle of natality. 
Arendt speaks here of humans as political beings, sociable, living in community. With 
common sense, not autonomous, but free, “gesellig, in Gemeinschaft lebend. Mit Gemein-
sinn, nicht autonom, aber frei” (ibid.). If the right to rights as the only right refers to this 
aspect of people in the plural, it seems possible to avoid positions that Arendt regarded as 
the conventional misconception of morality and politics, and narrowed down to certain 
phrases – the tyranny of truth, will enforcement and the intelligible ego – since interpret-
ing politics or the law should not be guided by principles emanating from monolithic and 
universalist ideas on the morally good. 
Arendt’s critique of the abstractness of human rights refers therefore to the assumption 
of false images of man because the biological or rational theory aspect was made absolute.
If justifications of this kind contribute to the impotence of human rights, how then can 
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the third aspect of human rights strengthen them? In the following I present two correct-
ives. 
II. The consequence for an understanding of the law: game rules
before defence rights
Following Arendt’s critique, Etienne Balibar focused on human rights as a driver of legal 
and political inclusion and exclusion. From Arendt’s line of argument Balibar concludes 
the existence of a so-called “Arendt theorem” (Balibar 2007: 264). Accordingly, human 
rights must be justified and anchored in civil rights because a right without a reciprocal 
character, i.e., a lonely natural right, would be bereft of any legal character (cf. Balibar 
2007: 265f.). In a similar vein, Sigrid Graumann discusses the inclusiveness of human 
rights protection (cf. Graumann 2011: 93). Democracy in Balibar does not act as a coun-
terweight , but as a prerequisite, as a guarantor, and as a medium (cf. Menke/Pollmann 
2007: 179) for human rights. For Arendt favours their political justification, based not on 
sovereign violence, as in the case of Carl Schmitt (see below), but on power. In fact, her 
concept of the political is indeed normatively charged: in Arendt’s work both democratic 
processes of consent and the legal implementation of human rights are based on plural 
consent. In order for consent to be factual as well as qualified, I suggest that the principles
of plurality and natality be taken into account and used as correctives in the interpreta-
tion of the law.
How can this be spun further for the interpretation of basic rights? In the ordinary way,
individual types of human rights are distinguished and understood as representing differ-
ent functions of the law. Liberal theories interpret them primarily as defence rights 
against the state; participatory approaches perceive them for the most part as political 
and economic participation rights (cf. Mührel/Röh 2008: 50; in depth Marshall 1975). 
Similarly, constitutional law asks whether basic rights are mere principles or first and 
foremost defence rights (cf. Poscher 2003).
Arendt interprets the freedom bestowed by human rights not as a negative freedom 
safeguarded by a protective right from attack by others, but sees it above all as the posit-
ive freedom to shape political life in the company of others. This would imply that Arendt 
prioritizes participation rights. Here she remains foreign to the German legal tradition, 
and not only in this case. The nineteenth century witnessed two diametrically opposed 
views in this context, von Savigny’s theory of will and von Jherings’s theory of interest, 
whose legal provisions still predominate in the combination theory that prevails today (cf.
Stephanians 2008: 1068); Arendt, on the other hand, would reject both (cf. Rosenmüller 
2013, 343ff.). According to Savigny, a right was an individual exercise of power in the area
where the will prevails. Apolitical is Arendt’s summary of this theory, which focuses on 
the sovereign exercise of will by the legal entity, since it fails to see the power to act as an 
individual assertion of will (cf. Arendt 1989b: 160; Förster 2009). Arendt would also re-
ject von Jhering’s position, which sees the law determined first and foremost by a conflict 
of interest. She consistently distinguishes between justifiable violence and legitimizing 
power (cf. Arendt 2000b). She justifies the law solely with the power of plural consent, 
which she sees anchored in political opinions rather than in economic interests. Hence in 
6 
Stefanie Rosenmüller | In what way are human rights abstract? | http://www.hannaharendt.net 
Arendt’s thinking, political action and political judgement would have to be born not of 
will power or advantage but of the freedom of imagination (cf. Arendt 2000c: 126).
For although free will is vital to initiating causal laws in the material world, it can also 
be an antidote to violence when it comes to rebellion and resistance (cf. Förster 2009). 
Nevertheless, individual free will remains pre-political and monological, and cannot 
therefore be considered the decisive freedom. It is my opinion that freedom of willpower 
is now protected, notably in the liberal rights of defence (cf. Rosenmüller 2013: 437ff.). 
This freedom in individual sovereignty from the interference of others is, according to 
Arendt, a necessary aspect of the law but plays a subordinate role. Genuine political free-
dom is the freedom of political opinions. In other words, it is not independence from oth-
ers, but freedom among fellow human beings, with others, i.e., a positive definition of 
freedom. Arendt’s political freedom is based on freedom of the imagination or the capa-
city for enlarged thought, “erweiterten Denkungsart”, that allows as many opinions as 
possible to be embraced (cf. Arendt 1998): the more this kind of thinking, the freer it is. 
This plural freedom also emerges in phronesis as the ability to have a sense of the world 
(cf. Arendt 2000a: 267). Such freedom of thought and of action underscores the political 
right to participate, and the right to rights as the right to participate in the political 
designing of processes of judgement. 
What does this mean in concrete terms? Whenever a person’s negative defence rights 
and free will are violated – when voting rights, freedom of opinion or life forms are ex-
cluded – it restricts the imagination of everyone else, since the excluded position is now 
no longer visible, perceived or recognized in the public space. It diminishes the enlarged 
thought of everyone else and consequently encroaches on their human rights. In this 
sense, protection in the form of a human right is at the same time always about the hu-
man rights of everyone else.
Arendt accordingly regards rights neither as properties of independent individuals 
worthy of protection (cf. Balibar 2007: 265; Arendt 1999: 766) nor as justifiable sanc-
tions, but rather as valid rules of the game, “Spielregeln” (Arendt 2000b: 96, Note 8: 
Arendt 2001a: 615: Arendt 1999: 761, Volk 2010: 22, 266). As such, constitutional rights 
would have to be interpreted to mean that the primary task of the law is to enable and en-
large the political space.
III. Application: human rights as positive freedom of the ima-
gination
What does this mean for the practical application of human rights? And what role should 
human rights play in the practical judgement of situations? To this end, it will first be ex-
plained how differently the powers of judgement proceed in assessing situations.
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a) Three judgement models
For the purpose of practical judgement, Arendt combines three models of judgement, 
which she borrows from Kant and Aristotle; I suggest these be understood as a sequence 
of three separate ways in which judgement works, all of which can be performed in every-
day situations. The first method is referred to in jurisprudence as subsumtion and de-
scribed by Kant as determinant judgement, whereby a case is subsumed under a rule. The 
second method Kant speaks of is reflective judgement (cf. B XXVIf., A XXIVf.), which 
functions more independently than determinant judgement because it decides on the rule
at issue and has the potential to generate new rules from examples, i.e., from individual 
cases; this is key when no rule exists. Kant admitted that although judgement may be ex-
ercised, it does not entail erudition such as perhaps memory skills or intellectual know-
ledge (Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, B172). The opposite can also happen, as in the case
of people who are well read but whose judgement skills leave much to be desired. It may 
even be the other way round and the talent for independent judgement will radiate onto 
the ability to practise determinant judgement. This corresponds to Arendt’s reading of 
Kant (cf. Kurbacher 2003) and implies that the real ability to judge is not based on the ap-
plication of rules but on being articulate about them.
Arendt appears to link Kant’s judgement models to the capacity of Aristotle’s phronesis 
(cf. Rosenmüller 2013: 209). Phronesis can be seen as the ability to judge (cf. Wolf 2007).
In her late text fragment Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, Das Urteilen (Arendt 
1998), Arendt worked on how to confront the challenges of political judgement in post-
traditional times. Imagination, that is, the ability to perceive differently from the intellect,
plays a major role as it remains connected to experience and sensual perception.
The heart of the matter here is the inadequacy of merely carrying out rules. Subsumtion
under rules, be they legal, moral or technical, is always implicit, of course, and also neces-
sary. It should, nonetheless, undergo correction by the two other judgement activities, 
leaving the result neither unfair nor cruel to the individual case. Judgement is guided by 
common sense, which acts both as a corrective and a principle (cf. Rosenmüller 2013). As 
a counterpoint to the selfishness, sensus privatus, “Selbst-Sinn”, of reason, which comes 
from the I-think, “Vernunft, die aus dem Ich-denke lebt”, Arendt describes this common 
sense and its basic function of perception and orientation with the metaphor of a sense of 
the world, “Weltsinn”, which survives on common sense (passive) and imagination (act-
ive), “der als Gemeinsinn (passiv) und als Einbildungskraft (aktiv) von dem anderen lebt” 
(Arendt 2002: 570). It is not self-centred reason, “selbst-gebundenen Vernunft”, but   
common sense and the power of imagination that creates a bond between people, “die 
Einbildungskraft, die das Band zwischen den Menschen bildet” (ibid.). Meints has 
demonstrated in great detail that common sense (Gemeinsinn) is the constitutional 
achievement of world- and self-relations by actor and spectator alike (cf. Meints 2011). 
But to what extent does this counteract the abstractness of human rights? And why does 
determinant judgement call for correction? General rules pursue a certain form of justice. 
This is not enough. The well-known example of Olympia winner Caster Semenya is a good
illustration. I argue that this model can be applied to ordinary examples of judgement and
the interpretation of rules.
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In 2009, Caster Semenya won the women’s 800 metres in Berlin and was the origin of a
dispute involving her physique, which raised the question of whether she was female or 
indeed intersexual. After lengthy attempts to establish what constitutes ‘female’ from a 
hormone and phenotype perspective, it was decided in 2011 that she should take andro-
gen-reducing drugs because her physical constitution gave her an unfair advantage. Hu-
man rights groups voiced strong criticism of the decision (cf. Knuth 2016). Let us now 
look at the meaning of this ruling from the perspective of Arendt’s critique of the abstract-
ness of human rights, and the corrections she might have suggested.
b)  The dangers of subsumtion 
This example fits in perfectly with Arendt’s warning: her critique of subsuming judgement
targets the cruel effects of a bureaucracy of pure legal positivism and the tyranny of reas-
on, as it makes an ideology of general rules and loses sight of reality in the process. Ima-
gination in the sense of a living outlook is ultimately drowned in a pseudo-reality that is 
both monological and totalitarian. 
Arendt claims that the seeds of the tyranny of reason can be traced back to Plato, who 
had a desire for philosophical rulers with uniform laws. She holds that in modern times 
so-called common sense, the conventional counter-concept to theoretical reason, is 
powerless against this tyranny. It can no longer be of assistance because it is based on tra-
ditions that are now obsolete (cf. Arendt 2000c: 110-127). In addition, history has shown 
that so-called common sense was also used to tailor interpretations of the law to the 
needs of the Nazi regime; the idea of a ‘sense of decency in all right and proper thinking 
individuals’ (‘Anstandsgefühl aller billig und gerecht Denkenden’,  Reichsgericht since 
1901) was perverted to mean a healthy national attitude, ‘gesundes Volksempfinden’. 
Arendt ultimately uses Kant’s construction of aesthetic judgement for the political 
implications of every judgement. Common sense in this case represents an idea of hu-
manity that symbolizes plural rather than abstract people.
c)  Phronesis as a subsumtion corrective 
In her writings, Arendt links a second component of common sense to Aristotle’s phrone-
sis. She describes the two components as a collaboration of inner sensor and practical 
sense (cf. Rosenmüller 2013: 234ff.). In doing so she resorts to a different meaning of 
common sense. In addition to the Latin root of sensus communis, which has more re-
semblance to Cicero’s community spirit, there is a Greek root, a common sense of percep-
tion called koine aisthesis, the so-called sixth sense that in the Antiquity was the inner 
sense that coordinated all five senses (cf. Grünepütt 1995). Arendt links this interpreta-
tion of common sense as the common perception of all five senses to common sense as a 
sense of community. What does that mean?
Arendt clearly wants to show that perception is not pre-political, but rooted in our soci-
etal and social conditions (cf. Arendt 2002: 335f.; Arendt 1989a: 59f.; Rosenmüller 2013: 
246ff.).  This is her attempt to explain how it was possible under Nazi rule to manipulate 
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the perception of reality to such an extent that the deportation of human beings was 
obliterated and perceived as the transportation of worthless objects. Arendt refers to this 
cruel form of unscrupulousness as ‘thoughtlessness’, “Gedankenlosigkeit” (Arendt 2001b: 
371), a hideout for lack of thought: monological thinking in clichés instead of critical 
dialogue. Added to this is lack of judgement, whereby perception of the world in relation 
to others breaks down. Phronesis or practical sense safeguards this reference to the world.
According to Arendt, world-related action is a sensible activity, “eine vernünftige 
Tätigkeit” (Arendt 1989a: 11), guided not by theoretical reason but by phronesis, a form of
world wisdom, “Weltweisheit” (Arendt 2000a: 267).
Phronesis in the Arendtian literature is understood as actor’s judgement (since Beiner 
1998, in Arendt 1998: 118ff.). Stateswomen and statesmen need it, as do civil society act-
ors. This is future- and action-oriented judgement where the uniqueness of a situation 
meets with a general principle in order to successfully resolve a situation. It calls for ex-
perience. Aristotle uses the metaphor of the archer with his eye on the target as an illus-
tration. Unlike the mere application of rules, it is vital to constantly enhance this principle
with meaning, allowing it to change – whereas a rule will always remain a rule.  It would 
be wise to use this ability when applying rules and to adhere to the principles employed by
archers when they perform. In civil law this refers, for example, to ideas of good faith, 
‘Treu und Glauben’ and in social law to the principle of social justice in the Social Code, 
the German Sozialgesetzbuch. These are principles that enrich the interpretation of or-
dinary rules for action, enlarging and correcting their application. 
In the Caster Semenya case, the dispute continued until a further legal ruling by the 
Court of Arbitration for Sport CAS decided in 2015 that hormone-reducing drugs were 
hostile to human rights. It argued that Caster Semenya’s physical make-up was her natur-
al state and that to all intents and purposes doping had not occurred (cf. Knuth 2016).  
If seen as a result of the phronesis corrective in the sense presented here, the concept of
‘female’ runners or of ‘natural state’ would have been interpreted more broadly than was 
conventionally the case since a normative orientation towards plural human rights cor-
rects the narrow understanding of a highly specific femaleness. Now that the concept of 
female runner has become more plural, at least more examples can be subsumed under 
Olympic regulations than before. Consequently, interpretation of the concept of humanity
has become more plural.
It should be added, however, that Caster Semenya would have had no opportunity in 
the entire procedure to present herself as other than ‘female’ – if she wished to avoid the 
risk of being excluded from the Olympic world. 
But does participation in the Olympic Games really count as a human right? It could be 
argued that participation in the Olympics cannot be a universal claim, but is simply a 
competition that presupposes certain performance standards, which CAS understood in 
the sense of natural privileges. The crucial question here is whether non-performance-re-
lated criteria creep into performance benchmarks unnoticed, leading to a violation of the 
principle of equality in international competition. Adherence to a specific notion of fe-
maleness led to the impossibility of demonstrating Semenya’s physical running talent, 
whereas the particular length, for example, of American swimmer Michael Phelps’s hands
and feet, which were advantageous to an outstanding swimming performance, in no way 
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led to his exclusion from the competition or even to the demand for a medical interven-
tion. 
d) Correction through reflective judgement
The phronesis corrective should therefore have been supplemented by correction through
reflective judgement. The reflective power of judgement is even more independent and in 
Arendt’s idiosyncratic reading of Kant takes two steps: it judges retrospectively according 
to the following three maxims of sensus communis. First maxim: Think for oneself (the 
maxim of enlightenment) – this means thinking dialogically and mainstream free; second
maxim: Put oneself in thought in the place of everyone else (the maxim of enlarged men-
tality) – this means visiting as many perspectives as possible, at least those of all con-
cerned, such as in a team discussion; third maxim: Be in agreement with oneself (the 
maxim of consistency) (cf. Arendt 1998: 49 ff.) – this means combining the first two max-
ims to reach a general point of view, not an objective view, but one that has undergone in-
tersubjective scrutiny. This corrective works against clichés, stereotypes and cruel 
'thoughtlessness' by allowing judgement to include the perceptions of as many people as 
possible.
Reflective judgement is also capable of something else: where no rule exists, it creates a 
new one from the example. In the case of Caster Semenya, this was quite clearly an ex-
cessive demand. Caster Semenya was initially stigmatized as an exception, an exception 
between female and male that had to be corrected and ‘de-androgenized’ to ensure that 
the binary rules of the Olympic Games were upheld. Those concerned could have contem-
plated new rules, be it for weight class or performance in preliminary rounds. A basic 
Olympic subdivision would have been called into question and extended. The failure to 
reinvent rules shows the extent to which this example cast doubts on traditional concepts 
of humanity.
Some of these new rules, however, give cause for serious objection.  Weight classes 
could exclude other groups or women could find themselves at a notorious disadvantage 
compared to men. This is not to deny the need for correction, but rather to concede that 
new rules call for a period of development, political debate and inventiveness. 
This would at least correspond to the purpose of Arendt’s critique, which is to show that
human being should not be made superfluous (cf. Meints-Stender 2004) or become ex-
ceptions, but should instead be seen as (counter-)examples and examples of something 
new, as people in a position to start anew and to forge new beginnings. In cases like this 
human rights are no longer abstract but given substance and made a reality as interpreted
by the enlargement of legal protection.
A fundamental objection to the principal meaning of the power of judgement has yet to 
be considered. Would the primacy of judgement itself not lead to arbitrary judgements? 
In terms of interpreting rights, it would certainly be a rule-free act of judgement and vir-
tually carte blanche for the ideological implications of judgement, something that Arendt 
wanted to confront in the Eichmann report. This should be taken into account when dis-
tinguishing between disputes in the political arena, on the one hand, and the political im-
plications of interpreting the law, on the other. 
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I argue therefore that the proposed order of applying the three activities of judgement is
procedurally relevant, the task being to correct the typical pitfalls of legal interpretation in
a consecutive and gradual process of mutual correction. Subsumtion under general rules 
allows determinant judgement to initially counteract the danger of arbitrary judgement 
that pursues self-interest or merely follows a whim. The task of phronesis is to guide legal 
interpretation with legal principles, and particularly to work against bureaucratic restric-
tions. Reflective judgement should then investigate the possible exclusion of perspectives 
and consequently compliance with the plurality criterion. It should only invent new rules 
in an emergency and as such do justice to the radically disruptive criterion of natality.
e) Once an exception, now an example
This less restricted method of judgement seeks a different form of generality than the gen-
erality of rules: generality in place of universality. The motto implied could read: Once an 
exception, now an example! In Arendt’s following of Kant, the reflective judgement is al-
ways an exemplary judgement (cf. Ferrara 2003). The actual judgement occurs when the 
new can be taken as an example. All other forms of judgement, notably determinant 
judgement, are based on this prototype of free judgement (cf. Kurbacher 2003). It can 
therefore be stated for the interpretation of the rule of law that Arendt represents an ut-
terly different concept of law than that of Carl Schmitt in his theory of sovereignty. 
In Schmitt the sovereign is whoever decides on the state of emergency, “wer den Aus-
nahmezustand bestimmt” (Schmitt 1934: 11); according to Schmitt the sovereign is simul-
taneously a constitutional figure of the law. It could now be argued that Schmitt’s think-
ing contains a judgement theory premise that can be impugned by Arendt. For Schmitt 
sees the validity of the rule of law in permanent opposition to the exception. This binarity,
however, is typical only of determinant judgement, which in the case of legal subsumtion 
must at all times observe whether a case falls under a certain rule or not (cf. Ginsborg 
2008). If we assume with Arendt that the basic form of judgement is reflective and not 
determinant, then the exception cannot be the key figure of thought for constitution of the
law, law based on the power of judgement (cf. Volk 2010, Förster 2009). It must be the 
example.
The example and the exception behave differently towards the rule: in extreme cases 
valid rules are diametrically opposed to the radical, uncontrollable exception. Examples, 
on the other hand, first of all confirm, explain and illustrate the rule. According to Kant 
they are the “go-cart of judgement”, “Gängelwagen” (KrV B173). As a counter-example, 
however, it can extend the rule, it is not in binary opposition to it. Judgement does not al-
ways have to suspend the rule, it can enlarge and reinvent rules and thus gradually en-
large human rights. 
This relatively imagined generality of the rule is more comprehensive than the idea of a 
universal rule, since it has the potential to gradually catch up on all of the counter-
examples. Democracy theorist Balibar refers to these ideas in Arendt as extensive univer-
salizing (cf. Menke/Pollmann 2007), whereby human rights encompass greater numbers 
of addressees instead of being doomed to failure due to their erroneous conception as 
mere rules of exception. The idea of the primacy of reflective judgement could serve to 
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perceive former exceptions as new examples of plural life forms (cf. Zerilli 2005). This 
would mean taking apparent exceptions and new life forms as an opportunity to rethink, 
expand and invent new rules that will enable rather than abstract from the 
implementation of human rights by all human beings.
Literature
Arendt, Hannah (1949): Es gibt nur ein einziges Menschenrecht. In: Die Wandlung 
4/1949, 754ff.
Arendt, Hannah (1981) [1967]: Vita activa. München: Piper.
Arendt, Hannah (1989a) [1979]: Vom Leben des Geistes. Band 1. Das Denken. Mün-
chen: Piper.
Arendt, Hannah (1989b) [1979]: Vom Leben des Geistes. Band 2. Das Wollen. Mün-
chen: Piper.
Arendt, Hannah (1998) [1985]: Das Urteilen. Texte zu Kants Politischer Philosophie. 
München: Piper.
Arendt, Hannah (2000a) [1965]: Über die Revolution. München: Piper.
Arendt, Hannah (2000b) [1970]: Macht und Gewalt. München: Piper.
Arendt, Hannah (2000c) [1994]: Zwischen Vergangenheit und Zukunft. Übungen im 
politischen Denken I. München: Piper.
Arendt, Hannah (2001a) [1955]: Elemente und Ursprünge totaler Herrschaft. Mün-
chen: Piper.
Arendt, Hannah (2001b) [1964]: Eichmann in Jerusalem. Ein Bericht von der Banalität 
des Bösen. Erw. Aufl. mit einem einleitenden Essay von Hans Mommsen. München: Pi-
per.
Arendt, Hannah (2002): Denktagebuch, Erster und Zweiter Band, hrsg. von Ursula 
Ludz/ Ingeborg Nordmann. München: Piper.
Arendt, Hannah (2003): Was ist Politik. Fragmente aus dem Nachlass, hrsg. Von Ursu-
la Ludz. München: Piper.
Arendt, Hannah, (2006): Über das Böse. Eine Vorlesung zu Fragen der Ethik. Mün-
chen: Piper.
Allen, Amy (2002): Power, Subjectivity, and Agency. Between Arendt and Foucault. In: 
International Journal of Philosophical Studies. Vol. 10, Issue 2, 131–149.
Alexy, Robert (1992): Begriff und Geltung des Rechts. Freiburg i.Br., München: Herder.
Alexy, Robert (2011): Die Doppelnatur des Rechts. In: Der Staat, Vol. 50, No. 3, S.389-
S. 404. 
Balibar, Etienne (2007): (De)constructing the Human as Human Institution. A Reflec-
tion on the Coherence of Hannah Arendt’s Practical Philosophy. In: Heinrich-Böll-Stif-
tung (Hrsg.): Hannah Arendt. Verborgene Tradition – Unzeitgemäße Aktualität. Berlin, S.
261–268.
Förster, Jürgen (2009): Die Sorge um die Welt und die Freiheit des Handelns. Zur in-
stitutionellen Verfassung der Freiheit im politischen Denken Hannah Arendts. Würzburg:
Königshausen & Neumann.
13 
Stefanie Rosenmüller | In what way are human rights abstract? | http://www.hannaharendt.net 
Graumann, Sigrid (2011): Assistierte Freiheit: Von einer Behindertenpolitik der Wohl-
tätigkeit zu einer Politik der Menschenrechte. Frankfurt a.M.: Campus.
Grünepütt, Katrin (1995): Sensus communis, Teil IV 1-2, 4. In: Joachim Ritter, Karl-
fried Gründer (Hrsg.) Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie. Bd. 9. Basel, Darmstadt: 
Schwabe Verlag, S. 661–669; S. 673–675.
Knuth, Johannes (2016): Caster Semenya - der komplizierteste Fall der Leichtathletik.  
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/sport/olympia-caster-semenya-der-komplizierteste-fall-
der-leichtathletik-1.3127927  .
Krawietz, Werner/ Aarnio, Aulis (1993): Rechtsnorm und Rechtswirklichkeit. Berlin: 
Duncker und Humblot. 
Kurbacher, Frauke Annegret (2003): Urteilskraft als Prototyp. Überlegungen im An-
schluß an Kants 'ästhetisch reflektierende Urteilskraft'. In: Frithjof Rodi (Hrsg.): Urteils-
kraft und Heuristik in den Wissenschaften. Beiträge zur Entstehung des Neuen. Weilers-
wist: Velbrück Wissenschaft, S. 185-195.
Marshall, Thomas H. (1975): Social Policy in the Twentieth Century. 4. ed., London: 
Hutchinson.
Meints-Stender, Waltraud (2004): Wie Menschen überflüssig gemacht werden. In: 
Waltraud Meints, Katherine Klinger (Hrsg.): Politik und Verantwortung. Zur Aktualität 
von Hannah Arendt. Hannover: Offizin, S. 105–121.
Meints, Waltraud (2011): Partei ergreifen im Interesse der Welt, Eine Studie zur politi-
schen Urteilskraft im Denken Hannah Arendts. Bielefeld: Transcript.
Menke, Christoph/Pollmann, Arnd (2007): Philosophie der Menschenrechte zur Ein-
führung. Hamburg: Junius.
Mührel, Eric/Röh, Dieter (2008): Menschenrechte als Bezugsrahmen in der Sozialen 
Arbeit. In: Widersprüche 2008, 28 (1), S. 47-63, [50].
Poscher, Ralf (2003) Grundrechte als Abwehrrechte. Reflexive Regelung rechtlich ge-
ordneter Freiheit. Mohr Siebeck: Tübingen.
Rosenmüller, Stefanie (2013): Der Ort des Rechts. Gemeinsinn und richterliches Urtei-
len nach Hannah Arendt. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
Schmitt, Carl (1934): Politische Theologie. Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität. 
München, Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot.
Schmitz, Hans-Gerd (2001): Die perspektivische Konstitution des Politischen. Überle-
gungen zu Hannah Arendts Wirklichkeitsbegriff. In: Karl Graf Ballestrem, Volker Ger-
hardt, Henning Ottmann, Martyn P. Thompson (Hg.) Politisches Denken. Jahrbuch 2001,
S. 18–31.
Stepanians, Markus (2008): Rechte/Grundrechte. In: Stefan Gosepath/ Wilfried 
Hinsch, Beate Rössler (Hrsg.): Handbuch der Politischen Philosophie und Sozialphiloso-
phie, Bd. 2. Berlin: De Gruyter, S. 1067-1074.
Volk, Christian (2010): Die Ordnung der Freiheit. Recht und Politik im Denken Han-
nah Arendts. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
Wolf, Ursula (2007): Aristoteles‘ „Nikomachische Ethik“, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche
Buchgesellschaft. 
Zerilli, Linda M. G. (2005): ‘Wir fühlen unsere Freiheit’. Einbildungskraft und Urteil im
Denken Hannah Arendts. In: Gerald Raunig, Ulf Wuggenig (Hg.): Publicum. Theorien der
14 
Stefanie Rosenmüller | In what way are human rights abstract? | http://www.hannaharendt.net 
Öffentlichkeit (republicart. Bd. 5). Wien, S. 56-65. Online (2004):http://www.republicart.-
net/disc/publicum/zerilli01_de. pdf (Seiten 1-7) 
15 
